NADA QUE VER IMAGEN, SUEÑO Y NEGATIDADES EN LA PRIMERA FILOSOFÍA DE JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

Producción científica: Contribución a una revistaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

Resumen

Jean-Paul Sartre’s early philosophy dedicated several fundamental texts to the problem of the image. The aim was to show that images, far from being objects, are one of the possible modalities of consciousness, different from the perceptive ones. However, dreams complicate this difference since the subject believes he perceives what are images created by consciousness. In order to explain the dream and to maintain its difference from perception, Sartre operates a shift in the interpretative paradigm that brings the dream closer to a kind of reading. Thus, dreams would then be the sum of images that fascinate and in which one believes as they resemble the story of a novel. However, the author shows that the similarity between dreaming and reading must be brought to a deeper level. Since dreams are inhabited by negatities such as lack, absence, frustration, or desire itself, they cannot be images, because an image cannot but present or represent entities. In order to reach these negative existences it is shown that, extending the Sartrean intuition, dreams are necessarily something read and not something seen.

Título traducido de la contribuciónNOTHING TO SEE: IMAGE, DREAMS AND NEGATITIES IN SARTRE’S EARLY PHILOSOPHY
Idioma originalEspañol (Ecuador)
Páginas (desde-hasta)63-90
Número de páginas28
PublicaciónConvivium
N.º34
EstadoPublicada - 3 jul. 2021
Publicado de forma externa

Nota bibliográfica

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Universitat de Barcelona. All rights reserved.

Palabras clave

  • discursivity
  • dream
  • image
  • Jean-Paul Sartre
  • negatities
  • reading

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